Isis will not be beaten by a kneejerk reaction from the west
The Nato summit has ended with the strongest signal yet that the UK may join US airstrikes on Isis in Iraq. But airstrikes are only addressing the current symptoms of a much deeper political crisis. The US's limited drone and jet attacks have helped prevent Isis advancing north. But it has also been of critical importance that Isis have absolutely no support in the autonomous Kurdish region. They've been fought hard on the ground by the Kurdish peshmerga forces, which Britain has now agreed to arm.
by Jane Kinnimont on 07-09-2014
| BRussells Tribunal |
Western airstrikes and drones have a poor track record against jihadi militant groups in Iraq or, indeed, elsewhere. As airstrikes expand, Isis will dig into civilian areas and innocents will be killed.
Kurdish peshmerga forces. Britain has agreed to give them arms. Photograph: Youssef Boudlal/Reuters
The Nato summit has ended with the strongest signal yet that the UK may join US airstrikes on Isis in Iraq. But airstrikes are only addressing the current symptoms of a much deeper political crisis. The US's limited drone and jet attacks have helped prevent Isis advancing north. But it has also been of critical importance that Isis have absolutely no support in the autonomous Kurdish region. They've been fought hard on the ground by the Kurdish peshmerga forces, which Britain has now agreed to arm.
However, the longer term struggle against Isis in Sunni-majority areas of Iraq and Syria will depend on much harder political work to address the roots of discontent in these areas. This would take into account the recent history of the "war on terror" in fomenting anti-western sentiment, as well as the systematic inequalities and exclusion that fuel sectarian conflict. Isis's viciousness makes it all too easy to portray the group as an evil force that has come out of the blue, which could be defeated by decisive western military action. But it is essential to remember the recent history of Iraq and Syria, and the west's involvement there, and to understand the factors that have enabled the group to expand from a few thousand extremists to a wealthy movement controlling swaths of territory.
There are two factors. The first is the chronic deficit of government legitimacy in Iraq and Syria, where systematically marginalised and excluded people create a supportive environment for radical groups promising change. The second is the brutality of recent politics in both those countries, which has been fuelled by regional and international proxy wars and by decades of coalition of support from disaffected tribes and de-facto disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis. Outgoing prime minister Nouri al-Maliki bears much of the blame for this; Iraq's Sunni tribes were his best ally against al-Qaida militants, but he squandered this by treating them as terrorists and locking up their sons.
But pinning all the blame on Maliki conveniently absolves the US and UK of responsibility for helping to create a political system where violence and sectarianism are the usual mechanisms for staying in power. Over the past 30 years, the west first supported and armed a genocidal dictator, then crippled the country with sanctions that failed to remove him, then invaded the country and dismantled the state and army. After 2003, the US and UK helped design a system of sectarian "power-sharing" where "power-sharing" means carving up government ministries – made extremely lucrative by raging corruption – between a tiny elite drawn from each ethnicity and sect.
Meanwhile, anti-western sentiment has been spiralling in Syria, not only among supporters of the government, but among the opposition. By saying Assad had to go, the west promised them change, but it did not stop Assad staying in power and killing many thousands of people. Western policymakers may doubt their capacity to resolve the crisis, but in the region, where the US in particular is seen as incredibly powerful, people simply think it lacked the will. Fortunately, Isis are not (yet) deeply rooted in either Iraqi or Syrian society; more, Isis are an indication of how desperate many people there are for an alternative to the status quo. There is a need to chip away at their support base – the alienated Iraqi Sunnis who are afraid of what they see as absolute domination by an Iranian-backed Shia government, and Syrians radicalised by years of conflict. Internationally, religious scholars, particularly in the Gulf and Egypt, can help combat Isis's ideas, likely to be more effective than token Gulf involvement in an aerial bombing campaign.
A new push for peace in Syria is also critical. Perhaps there is a chance that the fear of Isis will finally push the two sides to reach some kind of compromise. Peace in Syria and a new political settlement in Iraq will require the support both of Iran, which wields unique influence over both governments, and Saudi Arabia, which influences the mainstream opposition in both countries. There may be at last a chance for the two rivals to work together as they now see a common enemy in Isis.
A rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran would help to ease conflicts and tension across the Middle East. The US and UK are now tentatively reaching out to Iran, and should use their influence to facilitate Saudi-Iranian co-operation, but need to remember if Iraq just relies on Iran and Shia militias to fight Isis, it will simply worsen the underlying political problem of Sunni exclusion. Three things that won't defeat Isis are a kneejerk reaction to the videos of western hostages being killed, going back to the old models of dictatorship and airstrikes.
The western reaction to the execution videos has sent a message that such acts achieve international attention at the highest levels. Terrorism relies on a combination of brutality and communications strategy, and getting the US president to address them directly represents important recognition for a group seeking to publicise itself as a force.
The current nostalgia some western analysts express for Saddam's Ba'athist regime is based on a superficial analysis, especially since former Ba'athists are a critical part of the coalition that makes up Isis. Similarly, Assad cultivated some of the same jihadis to fight the US in Iraq less than a decade ago. Since 2011, his own sectarian brutality has radicalised them further. Assad's regime will need to take part in any peace talks, but working with him to fight Isis will help the group to drag more alienated Sunnis into their sphere of influence.
Western airstrikes and drones have a poor track record against jihadi militant groups in Iraq or, indeed, elsewhere. As airstrikes expand, Isis will dig into civilian areas and innocents will be killed.
The need for a political solution is acknowledged by all the western governments now considering their military options. But all of the underlying problems were already well known. Iraqi Sunnis protested for their rights peacefully in 2011 and were ignored. Syria was fading from our headlines until recently. Neglecting injustices until violent crises flare up creates incentives for violent groups. It leaves international policymakers dependent on military responses as a supposed quick fix that may contribute to the fundamental problems. Efforts to fight Isis need to focus on undermining the culture and ideology they are trying to plant in the region. Otherwise Isis will recur, perhaps in a different name or different form, in the coming years.
Jane Kinnimont is the deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. Abdullah Ali, Asfari Fellow on the same programme, contributed to this column
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