Maliki�s Policies: The Quest for Salvation at Iraq�s Expense
Policy Analysis Unit- ACRPS
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On
December 30, 2013, Iraqi security forces stormed the al-Ramadi protest
square, forcibly dispersing protesters. The move resulted in open
clashes between the army and the security forces, on one side, and armed
members of the al-Anbar tribes, on the other. Although the media has
been banned from reporting the clashes, it is becoming absolutely clear
that the government is facing an increasingly hostile environment. The
attack prompted Sunni religious authorities, such as Sheikh Abdul-Malik
al-Saadi and Iraq�s Grand Mufti Rafi Rifai, to issue strong statements,
accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of adopting sectarian policies.
They have also called for people to resist the attacking government
forces. Furthermore, over 40 Iraqi parliamentarians have submitted their
resignations to the Speaker of Parliament in protest, stating that the
al-Anbar clashes represent "a war that is far from terrorism, and is
certainly not a war of the army against the people, or Sunnis against
Shiites, it is the lust for power and political privileges."
The crisis began with the arrest of
Iraqi MP Ahmad al-Alwani, a prominent leader of the protest movement.
Al-Alwani was accused of inciting violence and sectarianism and
insulting Shiites, although a parliamentary investigation committee
concluded that the charges were false. Al-Alwani�s hostile language was,
in fact, directed primarily at a few Sunni parliamentarians from
al-Anbar who took a negative stance toward the protest movement. The
government disregarded the committee�s findings, and ordered the arrest
of the "dissident" MP at his home in the city of Ramadi on December 28,
2013. The operation was carried out by the counter-terrorism apparatus
and led to the killing of al-Alwani�s brother, alongside a number of his
bodyguards. This action was in clear violation of Article 63 of the
Constitution, which grants legal immunity to members of Parliament. The
article also states that it is not permissible to arrest an MP until
after immunity has been lifted, which can only be done with the approval
of an absolute majority in the parliament.
The Background of the Crisis
The failure of the ruling elites to address major problems[1]
since the American invasion in April 2003, was the latent force behind
the protest movement, which started in the Sunni regions in December
2012.
The central government has held a
negative position regarding these protests since the beginning. Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki resorted to threats and intimidation, framing
the protests as externally-backed acts of treason. The Protestors
remained adamant nonetheless, and thereby forcing al-Maliki to consider a
different approach. He created official committees to study the
protestors� key demands while at the same time attempting to link the
protest movement to al-Qaeda, and specifically to the Islamic State of
Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). Furthermore, in order to justify issuing
arrest warrants on "terrorism" charges, the government accused the
protest movement�s leaders of inciting violence and sectarianism,
forcing most of them to leave Iraq.
Yet, the truth that goes unheeded by
many analysts is that the leaders of these peaceful protests are the
same people who fought and defeated al-Qaeda when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
was leading the organization. They were called the Awakening
(al-Sahwat). They acted as a replacement to the political parties and
the state institutions during the American occupation. They accuse the
central government today for being sectarian, discriminating against
Sunni regions, and being subservient to Iran.
Having tested their resolve and failed,
al-Maliki decided to use force against the protesters, taking advantage
of the atmosphere surrounding a major al-Qaeda operation against the
Iraqi Army.
On December 22, 2013, ISIS targeted and killed the commander of the Iraqi Army�s 7th
Division, Major General Mohammad al-Karawi, alongside dozens of other
high ranking army officers. General Al-Karawi was commander of the
Brigade that stormed the protest square in Hawija on April 23, 2013, leaving at least 163 protesters
dead and wounded. The reaction of al-Maliki to the killing of General
Al-Karawi was hysterical. He threatened to burn the protesters� tents,
claiming that they were not just a place for recruiting terrorists, but
for sheltering them too. The biggest political forces in Iraq, including
the Sadri movement, the Iraqiya List, president of Iraq�s Kurdistan
region, and the Supreme Islamic Council, have all denounced al-Maliki�s
threats, calling instead for dialogue, a distinction between al-Qaeda
and the protesters, and the meeting of the people of Anbar�s demands.
Al-Maliki�s Goals
Al-Maliki�s strategy was to create
confusion about different issues so that he can shoot many birds with
one stone. He would order a military operation against armed groups in
the Anbar desert i.e. al-Qaeda, storm the sit-ins in Ramadi and arrest
MP al-Alwani, whose name has figured prominently as the archenemy of the
Shiite in the laments of Ashoura and other religious Shiite events.
He acted in this way so that he could
use these considerations as leverage in the Council of Representative
elections scheduled for April 30, 2014. Al-Maliki and his State of Law
Coalition experienced a decline in popularity in the April 2013
provincial elections in comparison to 2009. Though al-Maliki received
1,709,318 votes in the last election (excluding votes from the provinces
of Diyala and Salah al-Din), approximately 400,000 more than he
received in 2009, this increase is the result of his coalition�s joining
with the Reform Movement, headed by Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the Islamic
Virtue Party, and the Badr Organization, headed by Hadi al-Amiri, an
offshoot from the Supreme Islamic Council.[2] The end result was that the State of Law Coalition has not been able to keep the votes it received during the 2009 elections.[3]
In order to boost his popularity, and
attempt to return for a third term, al-Maliki used Ahmad al-Alwani�s
arrest to mobilize Shiites and play upon their emotions. This would be
an operation through which he would be able to present himself once
again as the strong man of Iraq and a defender of the Shiites in the
face of "Wahhabis/terrorists and Baathists," labels he indiscriminately
applies to all Sunnis. According to al-Maliki, these people want to
"regain power and produce mass graves anew."
Indeed, Al-Maliki would prefer to
postpone the elections so that his government could stay in power in the
absence of parliament. This might prove difficult however because
article 39 of the elections law places three conditions for the
postponement of elections.[4] Firstly, a request to postpone the elections must be made to the Board of Commissioners in the Independent High Electoral Commission;
secondly, a decision to postpone the elections must be issued by the
Council of Ministers; and, lastly, the approval of Parliament is needed.
In practice, therefore, it is almost impossible to postpone elections
without a Shiite-Sunni-Kurdish consensus.[5] Thus, any decision made by the Board of Commissioners will depend primarily upon the positions of all the political parties.
Indeed, the decisions made by the
Council of Ministers are often dominated by the prime minister not only
because there is no internal decision-making system, but also because
many ministers make their decisions at the behest of al-Maliki�s rather
than representing the position of their political blocs. This is
particularly true for the ministers of the Iraqiya List. The Sadris and
the Kurdistan Alliance ministers, holding only 12 portfolios, would have
a difficult time trying to block a decision to postpone the elections.
Conversely, for over three years, al-Maliki has failed to pass any law
in Parliament, signifying that the Parliament approval would be even
more difficult to obtain.[6]
The political forces are well aware that postponing elections would
effectively mean allowing al-Maliki to rule with absolute authority in
light of President Jalal Talabani�s absence and since the extension for
Parliament is simply not possible. Article 56/1 states that "the
electoral term of the Council of Representatives is four calendar years,
starting from its first session and expiring at the end of the fourth
year." Further, the Iraqi constitution stipulates that the elections
take place "within forty-five days after the end of the previous
election cycle (Article 56/2)." From a constitutional standpoint, these
timings effectively eliminate any real possibility to postpone
elections.
Future Prospects
Having realized the trouble he got into
by choosing to face the tribes of western Iraq, al-Maliki was forced to
issue a more conciliatory statement. In response to the demands of the
resigned MPs, al-Maliki announced on December 31, 2013, that the army
would withdraw from the cities and turn them over to the local and
federal police forces. Indeed, the prime minister backed out and kept
the army in the cities of al-Anbar. But even if the army had withdrawn,
no real change would have occurred as the federal police force would
have preserved the Ministry of Interior�s control over security issues
in these provinces.
Al-Maliki has placed himself in a real
predicament because the opposition will not allow him to exit al-Anbar
as easily as he entered, particularly after the arrest of MP al-Alwani
and the storming of the protest squares. Arms were raised in the face of
the army, and they will not be returned to their hiding places, without
having made a change to al-Maliki�s blatant sectarian policies. The
self-confidence the tribes have earned after halting the offensive of
the government forces would also translate into further challenge to
al-Maliki�s authority. On the other hand, al-Maliki will not be able to
free MP al-Alwani as al-Anbar�s tribes desire because doing so would
simply mean total submission to their will. This would affect the image
al-Maliki has been trying to create for himself through his reign and
threaten by extension his chances of winning the upcoming elections.
The decision to use violence to resolve
political differences has thrust Iraq into an open confrontation that
might develop into a full-fledged civil war. The events following the
2006 bombings of the Shrine of the Two Imams[7]
might prove minor incidents compared to what we might see today, given
the wider sectarian tension in region. Al-Maliki and his coalition, must
engage in genuine dialogue with the other political forces in order to
avoid this possibility and agree on the foundations of a new Iraqi
state. Exclusion, marginalization, and sectarianism must hence be
abandoned or Iraq will descend into the most horrifying scenario.
**This Assessment was translated by the ACRPS Translation and English Editing Department. The original Arabic version published on January 2nd, 2014 can be found here. [1] Foremost among these are the agreement on the state�s structure and political system and the distribution of power and wealth in a just manner by establishing a democratic system based in citizenship.
[2] The Reform Movement gained 268,510 votes and the
Islamic Virtue Party gained 141,601 votes in the 2009 elections; that
is, the total is 409,750 votes, exceeding the increase that the State of
Law Coalition obtained, which amounted to 338,709 votes in the 2013
elections. This is excluding the votes received by the Badr
Organization, which were difficult to determine from the 2009 elections
because they were part of the Supreme Islamic Council.
[3] The independent Liberal Bloc received 423,076
votes in 2009; the four lists of Sadrist movements received 883,268
votes in 2013; the Shahid al-Mihrab list and independent forces received
452,183 votes in 2009; and the Citizen Coalition, representing the same
bloc with a change of name, received 921,260 votes in 2013.
[4] The issue of postponing the elections was
completely overlooked in the laws for provincial elections in 2013,
allowing Maliki to postpone the elections in both the Anbar and Ninevah
provinces. This was widely seen as a political decision aimed at
influencing the outcome of the elections in these two provinces. There
was then a legal controversy relating to who has the authority to
postpone elections that the law has overlooked.
[5] The Board of Commissioners consists of nine
members chosen based on sectarian quotas (4 Shiites, 2 Sunnis, 2 Kurds,
and 1 Turkmen). Politically, the Commission members are selected by a
committee from the Council of Representatives.
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